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Abstract: After the relatively successful system transformation, some young demo-
cratic countries from Central and Eastern Europe which used to receive democratic 
aid in the 1980s and 90s have engaged as new donors in assisting pro-democratic 
changes in other post-communist countries. The donor-recipient relations between 
two post-communist countries can be observed on the example of the development 
of cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. This paper deals with Polish assistance 
to new media in Ukraine in from 2007-2017 as a part of supporting democracy in 
Ukraine under the Polish Cooperation Development Program. Firstly, this work ex-
amines whether the Polish government’s support of Ukrainian media as part of coop-
eration development will be sustained regardless of changes in the Polish government. 
Secondly, the paper explores whether Polish NGOs tailor their projects, financed 
by the Polish MFA, to the recipients’ respective needs and the current situation in 
Ukraine. By examining Polish media assistance, the authors aim to explain the efforts 
of the new donor in developing media in a partner country, emphasizing the relation 
between the involvement of external actors and the presence of independent media 
which play an important role in democratization processes.
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Introduction
Over the years, some donor countries have engaged in supporting political, economic and social development by providing foreign 
aid to their partner countries. This practice is known as development 
cooperation and due to its significance for international relations it has 
gained a lot of attention from scholars as well as from policy-makers 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). To support world develop-
ment, donors often decide to provide not only humanitarian aid, but also 
to assist pro-democratic changes in countries in transition. The official 
1 The paper is a part of the research project under the funding scheme of NCN 
Sonata (UMO-2013/09/D/HS5/04381).
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development assistance (ODA)2 as a form of inequalities’ reduction is still 
maintained by the majority of donors, also by those who were reported by 
Freedom House as facing some declines in political and civic freedoms 
by Freedom House in recent reports (FH, 2016; FH, 2017a; FH, 2017b). 
Hungary and Poland are among such countries.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to take an attempt to examine Polish 
bilateral democracy assistance aimed at supporting new media develop-
ment in Ukraine under the governance of the Civil Platform (2007–2015) 
and the Law of Justice (after 2015). Poland joined the Development As-
sistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) in 2013 but the Polish governments and 
NGOs have been involved in democracy assistance since early 90s and in-
tensified their activities after joining European Union in 2004. The goal of 
providing support for media development, which is still under-researched 
type of democracy assistance, is to boost freedom of the press based on 
freedom of expression and freedom of information as a fundamental hu-
man rights.3 Governmental ‘Polish Aid’ program is mainly realised by the 
third sector on the basis of their own transition experiences in order to 
foster democratisation in recipient countries (Pospieszna, 2016a, 2016b; 
Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, Lightfoot, 2015). It includes also the 
support given to the development of all types of media in Ukraine – tel-
evision, radio, press, and new media (internet outlets and social media).
The goal of this research is not only to look at concrete media projects 
implemented by NGOs, but to also trace if Poland as a donor tailors its 
support to recipient’s needs, such as the emergence of armed conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine after Euromaidan events. What is important, by examin-
2 OCD defines official development assistance (ODA) as ‘flows to countries and 
territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which 
are: provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies; and each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promo-
tion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 
25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).’
3 The terms ‘freedom of the press’, ‘freedom of the media’ and ‘media independ-
ence’ will be used alternatively in this work. Freedom of information can be defined 
as the right to access information held by public bodies which was recognized by 
Resolution 59 of the UN General Assembly adopted in 1946 as well as by Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948. Freedom of information is understood 
as an extension of freedom of speech (referred to also as freedom of expression) as 
a fundamental human right (Sobczak, 2007) being a basis for freedom of the press.
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ing a piece of ‘Polish Aid’, directed at support for new media in Ukraine, 
it will be possible to deliver some preliminary answers on important ques-
tion whether political environment in donor country affects its democracy 
assistance strategy. Therefore, this paper aims to fill the existing gap in 
the literature on democracy assistance by linking the issues of the role of 
independent media in the process of democratization and the role of the 
external actors. In particular, this research will touch upon assessing the 
new media assistance of Poland, being one of the most intensively en-
gaged in sharing own transition experiences among CEE countries.
The substantial experiences gained by Poland and other new donors 
during the process of system transformation are regularly used by gov-
ernmental and non-governmental actors engaged in democracy assistance 
which might constitute a valuable lesson for especially Eastern European 
aid recipients sharing some common historical and social characteristics 
with the new donors (Pospieszna, 2016a, 2016b; Szent-Iványi, 2014; 
Szent-Iványi, Lightfoot, 2015). Taking under consideration recent reports 
showing the setback in Polish democracy, especially the decline of free-
dom of the press (FH, 2017a) as a result of the governance of Law and 
Justice party after 2015,4 this article analyses if there are differences in 
media assistance provided by Poland in Ukraine before and after parlia-
mentary and presidential elections in Poland in 2015. Two hypotheses are 
to be tested through the examination of primary and secondary sources, 
such as multiannual development cooperation programmes, annual plans, 
reports published by Polish MFA and NGOs:
H1: Polish government’s media support to Ukraine within Poland’s de-
velopment cooperation has the same specific goals and thematic pri-
orities regardless changes in the Polish government.
H2: In providing media assistance to Ukraine, Polish NGOs’ tailor their 
projects aimed at supporting new media to current socio-political 
situation.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, scholarly lit-
erature on development cooperation, democracy assistance, media assist-
ance and foreign influence will be reviewed. Then the authors will present 
4 According to the newest report ‘Freedom of the Press 2017’, mass media in Po-
land were rated as ‘partially free’ due to “government intolerance toward independent 
or critical reporting, excessive political interference in the affairs of public media, and 
restrictions on speech regarding Polish history and identity, which have collectively 
contributed to increased self-censorship and polarization” (FH, 2017a, pp. 23).
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an empirical part describing Polish ODA strategy as an element of foreign 
policy since 2007 and providing examples of Polish aid projects aimed 
at supporting new media in Ukraine. The case study of Polish-Ukrainian 
cooperation sheds some light on how two post-communist countries may 
interact with each other as a donor and recipient countries in the field of 
the development of media.
Development cooperation, democracy assistance, media assistance
Over the years, a fair amount of interest was devoted to the different 
types of democracy assistance5 carried out mainly by Western donors in 
developing countries (e.g. Alesina, Dollar, 2000; Burnell, 2000; Caroth-
ers, 1999, 2004; Diamond, 1999; Ethier, 2003; Olsen, 2000; The Com-
monwealth, 2016; Youngs, 2008). Specifically, the term ‘donor’ covers 
different governmental, quasi-governmental, non-profit organizations, 
aid agencies or individuals that advocate for the spread of democracy 
and devote to this purpose some resources in developing countries. The 
major donors examined in the literature are United States (US) and the 
Western European Union members, who have been consistent in support-
ing electoral processes, political institutions and parties, rule of law, civil 
society and free media in recipient countries (Carothers, 1999; Kumar, 
2006; Pospieszna, 2014). The main partners in development cooperation, 
also referred to as aid ‘recipients’, were the countries going through the 
transformation process in CEE in the 80s and 90s, on the Balkans and 
in Russia (Burnell, 2000; McMahon, 2004; Mendelson, 2001; Richter, 
2002; Siegel, Yancey, 1992). Also media assistance was a part of such co-
operation within democracy assistance in last decades (Howard, 2003).
However, recent studies demonstrated that not only Western donors, 
but also young democracies from the third wave of democratization in 
CEE (Huntington, 1991) stimulate pro-democratic changes in neighbour-
5 Despite the fact that in many works terms ‘democracy promotion’ and ‘democ-
racy assistance’ are used interchangeably like in Youngs (2008), this paper emphasises 
the difference in meaning following Azpuru, Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, Seligson (2008) 
and Pospieszna (2014). Democracy assistance is understood here as just one of the 
measures of promoting democracy. In contrary to wider efforts to promote democracy, 
including diplomatic pressure, aid conditionality or economic sanctions, democracy 
assistance highlights the role of partners in recipient countries in the development 
cooperation to establish democracy.
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ing countries since they learned from their own transition experiences 
and were the recipients of democracy assistance themselves not that long 
ago (Beichelt, Hahn-Fuhr, Schimmelfenning, Worschech, 2014; Chimiak, 
2016; Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka, 2013; Horký-Hlucháň, Lightfoot, 2015; 
Jonavicius, 2008; Kucharczyk, Lovitt, 2007; Petrova, 2014a; Pospieszna, 
2014, 2016a, 2016b; Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, Lightfoot, 2015). 
The process of spreading ideas, institutions, policies and models across 
neighbouring countries through different channels is known in the litera-
ture as democracy diffusion (Brinks, Coppedge, 2006; Bunce, Wolchik, 
2006). Democracy assistance is considered playing an important role 
in diffusion of democracy (Petrova, 2014a). New findings on the spe-
cific character of democracy assistance provided by new democracies in 
Europe, called emerging donors, such as Poland and other members of 
Visegrad Group (V4), triggered the scholarly debate on external influ-
ences on democratization. Poland in the field of supporting democracy 
abroad since the 90s is involved in the full spectrum of activities to pro-
mote democracy mainly in neighbouring countries which includes also 
the interest in providing the support for media development.
While some authors appreciated the efforts of V4 countries, including 
Poland, to promote democratic values, and even named them as ‘democ-
racy new champions’ (Kucharczyk, Lovitt, 2007), others showed donors’ 
limited funding for democracy assistance in comparison to Western sup-
port (Petrova, 2014b) or even governments’ anti-democratic moves like 
in the cases of Hungry and Poland (FH, 2017b). Nevertheless, democracy 
assistance is mainly implemented in CEE region by non-state actors who 
tailor their international projects for partner countries independently from 
the government (Pospieszna, 2016a, 2016b; Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-
Iványi, Lightfoot, 2015). Polish funding for official development aid, in-
cluding democracy assistance, has been maintained even after the victory 
of Law and Justice in 2015.6 Scholars who examined the activities of new 
donors, such as Poland, pointed at good recognition of partners’ needs as 
well as political and social context visible in the development coopera-
tion (Chimiak, 2016; Kucharczyk, Lovitt, 2007; Lexmann, 2014; Petrova, 
2014a; Pospieszna, 2014). Still, despite there are recent studies on post-
communist countries involvement in democracy assistance, there is a no-
ticeable gap in the literature on particular types of democratic support of 
6 On the basis of Polish Aid’s data available at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/
Calls,for,proposals,183.html, 20.05.2017.
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CEE countries to their post-communist partners, especially concerning 
the support given to media.
From the donors’ perspective the main aim of media assistance is to 
embrace freedom of the press and to promote professional, independent 
news media in developing countries (Tsetsura, Grynko, Klyueva, 2011). 
As in Ukraine case, many aid recipients go through the democratisation 
process while cooperating with more developed donors. According to Re-
porters Without Borders, an international non-governmental organization 
focused on monitoring media freedom in the world, in practice freedom 
of the press is measured by the scope of media pluralism (political and 
economic), media independence, media transparency, the scale of cen-
sorship and the quality of legal frameworks and media infrastructure.7 
Governments, NGOs and private donors dedicate funds to improve those 
patterns freedom of the press to contribute to the development of media 
in their partner countries. Therefore, media assistance is expected to help 
to produce better journalism, better media organizations as well as better 
media systems in partner countries in order to foster democracy (Higgins, 
2014) by informing society and keeping authorities accountable (Kumar, 
2006, 2009) (Kumar, 2006, 2009).
The existing literature on freedom of expression and media effects 
does not translate directly into better understanding of the democracy as-
sistance efforts. The importance of traditional and media, which will be 
described in the next section, to some extent seems to be recognized by 
democracy promoters and underlies many of the Western donors’ pro-
grams aimed at fostering free media in developing countries. For example, 
US-based Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) highlights 
the significance of the media in bringing about the democratic change in 
post-communist countries (Hume, 2011). Many other EU members fol-
lowed the idea to invest in raising the freedom of speech and the media 
pluralism in former soviet countries. Although there are some statistics of 
the funding for media development by major donors outside the US (My-
ers, 2009), works exploring aid flows as well as main characteristics of 
media assistance provided by countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
are still insufficient.
Moreover, if there was any attention paid to the matter of media as-
sistance in Europe, scholars concentrated on the media support directed 
7 Based on the methodology of World Press Freedom Index developed by Report-
ers without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology, 20.05.2017.
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mainly at the Balkan countries given to traditional media outlets (Cornell, 
Thielen, 2006; Karlowicz, 2003; Rhodes, 2007). Despite one report on 
Western donors’ support to independent media in Ukraine (Tsetsura et 
al., 2011), little is known about in terms of receiving by Ukrainian me-
dia the external support. Therefore, by putting the emphasis on Polish 
governmental assistance, implemented by NGOs and aimed at fostering 
the development of Ukrainian online media outlets, it is believed here to 
deepen the understanding of the development cooperation between two 
bordering, post-communist states in Central Europe.
‘Old’ and ‘new’ media for democratisation
The external support for media development as one of the elements of 
strengthening democracy deserves to gain more attention in the scientific 
discourse in recent years due to the historical roles that media played in 
countries that went through transition from non-democratic to democratic 
regimes (Bohdanova, 2014; Dyczok, 2009; Jakubowicz, Sükösd, 2008; 
Obydenkova, 2008; Ullah, 2009; Voltmer, 2013). One of the processes, 
on which the media have an impact, is democratization, understood as 
a gradual, consisting of several stages change to democratic form of po-
litical regime (Gunther, Diamandouros, Puhle, 1995). Democratization 
is a part of the holistic system transformation which includes political 
changes as well as the transformation of society (development of civil so-
ciety) and economic system (mainly the introduction of the free market). 
The transformation to democracy is interrelated with the liberalisation 
of media system and the increase of media independence (Jakubowicz, 
Sükösd, 2008; Sasińska-Klas, 1994; Voltmer, 2013). The role of media in 
democratisation should be considered in two ways, as dependent and in-
dependent variable of democratic development (Jebril, Stetka, Loveless, 
2013). In practice it means that media might be treated both as a system 
undergoing through transformation, which includes e.g. the abolition of 
censorship and state monopoly, and as ‘a necessary precondition of de-
mocracy’ (Jebril et al., 2013, p. 10).
The studies carried out in last decades proved that mass media can 
play a central role in the democratic transformation, but it does not auto-
matically mean that only media determine the success or failure of sys-
tem change (Beacháin, Polese, 2010; Voltmer, 2013). Media of all types 
can enable the struggle emerging between democratic movements and 
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the authoritarian regimes in the process of democratisation (Downing, 
1996). Despite the fact that mass media are considered as active partici-
pants of political communication (McNair, 1998), which is important for 
democratization, it has not been clearly resolved so far whether the media 
cause social and political changes or just follow these processes (Jebril, 
Stetka, Loveless, 2013). As pointed by Voltmer (Voltmer, 2013, p. 2), 
‘third wave’ of democratization was distinguished from earlier system 
transitions by the ‘the active involvement of the media and their strategic 
use by those fighting for (or against) democracy’. Taking under consid-
eration the progressive globalisation and the spread of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) in recent two decades, not precisely 
defined roles of mass media in the processes of democratisation deserve 
further scientific reflections.
However, most researchers from the fields of political science and me-
dia studies agree that media fulfil diverse, socially important functions 
such as a) informing as providing information about current events and 
identifying power relations; b) correlating as interpreting the reality and 
building the social consensus; c) ensuring continuity understood as ex-
pressing the dominant values to build a community; d) entertaining as 
reducing social tensions, and finally e) mobilizing society to take actions 
in the sphere of e.g. politics (Breuer, 2012; Chyliński, Russ-Mohl, 2008; 
Gilboa, 2005; Jebril et al., 2013; McCombs, 2014; McQuail, 2010). The 
social functions of media are also described in relation to the potential 
of creating a platform for public discourse, educating the public or con-
trolling authorities (Kunczik, Zipfel, 2000; McNair, 1998). It should be 
also noted that full spectrum of above-mentioned roles can be realized by 
media only in democratic environment and event then also some dysfunc-
tional media’ actions can be observed (Baran, Davis, 2007; Nierenberg, 
2007).
Even if media have more or less limited possibilities of informing, 
educating or mobilizing society in countries in transitions, they are still 
involved in transformation processes which was visible on the examples 
of colour revolutions (Beacháin, Polese, 2010; Kudlenko, 2015; Lysenko, 
Desouza, 2012), Arab Spring (Arafa, 2015; Cottle, 2011; Lynch, Free-
lon, Aday, 2016; Robertson, 2013) or recently during Euromaidan (Boh-
danova, 2014; Shveda, Park, 2016; Zaliznyak, 2014). Speaking of Post-
Soviet space, some authors point the existence of independent media as 
one of the factors contributing to the final result of colour revolutions, 
in addition to e.g. strong opposition, civil society or the involvement of 
ŚSP 2 ’17 Supporting new media in Ukraine through Polish... 177
foreign actors (Beacháin, Polese, 2010). Observing the systems transfor-
mations to more democratic after 2000, especially previously mentioned 
colour revolutions, Arab Spring and protest in Ukraine, many scholars 
recognised both the importance and the ambiguity of new technologies 
and new media (e.g. Armbrust, 2007; Cottle, 2011; Etling, Roberts, Faris, 
2014; Kyriakopoulou, 2011; Lynch, 2015; Lynch et al., 2016; Olorun-
nisola, Martin, 2013; Onuch, 2015; Robertson, 2013; Tsetsura, 2015).
Due to the growing popularity of new media, this article focuses on 
the external support from Poland for the development of digital media 
outlets and social media in Ukraine. The term ‘new media’ usually covers 
any kind of content being available online on users’ demand. Despite the 
confusion that the ‘newness’ of media causes, there is an agreement in 
the literature that ‘new media’ have several characteristics such as being 
digital, virtual (computer-mediated), networked and interactive (Lister, 
Dovey, Giddins, Grant, Kelly, 2009; Manovich, 2001). In practice, new 
media include online outlets of traditional press, radio and television as 
well as social media understood as ‘a group of internet-based applica-
tions, build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0,8 
and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content’ (Ka-
plan, Haenlein, 2010, p. 62). Social media are based on networks of peo-
ple involved in creating collaborative projects (e.g. Wikipedia), sharing 
content on blogs and microblogs (e.g. Twitter) and being active on social 
network sites (SNS) where users create their own profiles (e.g. Facebook, 
Vkontakte).
The pro-democratic movements happening in past decade, such as the 
Egypt’s ‘Facebook Revolution’, Iran’s ‘Twitter Uprising’ (El-Nawawy, 
Khamis, 2012), Ukrainian Euromaidan (Bohdanova, 2014), delivered 
some proofs of the growing scale of the digital media outlets as well as 
social media’ usage for political mobilization. Scholars from media stud-
ies as and political science highlighted both positive and negative aspects 
of the spread of new media in recent years (Olorunnisola, Martin, 2013; 
Pearce, Kendzior, 2012; Robertson, 2015; Sandoval-Almazan, Ramon 
Gil-Garcia, 2014). In present scholarly debate, there are both reflections 
and case studies proving the ‘liberation technology’ potential (Diamond, 
2012) of new media, highlighting the role of social media, in the proc-
8 The idea of Web 2.0 is based on interactivity. As a consequence of its popularity, 
personal websites dominating in era of Web 1.0 (before 2004) were replaced by social 
networks, blogs and collaborative projects where people can easily communicate with 
each other.
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esses of democratisation, and more sceptical attitudes, treating new tech-
nologies as ‘net delusion’ (Morozov, 2011).
Some of the pros of new media include their contribution to empower-
ing individuals, fostering mobilisation and independent public sphere as 
well as strengthening the development of civil society (Arafa, 2015; Elt-
antawy, Wiest, 2011; Lopes, 2014; Yesayan, 2014). On the basis of some 
of the recent studies it can be concluded that internet brings opportunities 
to pluralise the flows of information and increase the degree of freedom of 
speech (Bohdanova, 2014; Diamond, 2012; Howard, Hussain, 2011) not 
only in democratising countries but also in authoritarian regimes. Shirky 
(Shirky, 2009, 2011) argues that new technologies brought broader access 
to information resulting in the empowerment of citizens to undertake in-
dividual and collective actions. What is more, this digital media’ potential 
for mobilisation may be important for contentious politics (Aday et al., 
2010) and social movements’ appearance (Bastos, Mercea, Charpentier, 
2015; Lopes, 2014). Last but not least, some authors point at new media 
as a part of accountability mechanism which allows civil society to moni-
tor authorities (Diamond, 2012), regarding both professional journalists 
publishing materials online as well as citizen journalist, taking attempts to 
inform their audience in new media (Doliwa, 2012; Gillmor, 2006).9
On the other hand, the literature proves also that the spread of new 
communication technologies and practices may be used by authoritar-
ian regimes in order to extend state-surveillance and censorship, counter 
civil society actions and spread anti-democratic propaganda (Morozov, 
2011, 2012; Pearce, Kendzior, 2012; Soldatov, Borogan, 2015). For ex-
ample, the phenomenon of ‘networked authoritarianism’ (Pearce, Kend-
zior, 2012, p. 295) explains the mechanisms of using new media by non-
democratic states to manipulate the information flows and to discourage 
citizen from using social alternative sources of news. Nonetheless, even if 
scholars face some difficulties in assessing the exact role of new media in 
democratisation, existing literature indicates the functions that journalists 
can fulfil during the processes of political and societal changes. There-
fore, it is not a surprise that the matter of media development, including 
online media, started to be recognized also by international actors who 
9 Citizen journalism (referred also as grass-roots or participatory journalism) is 
understood as an alternative for traditional journalism based on the reporting news by 
activists led by social interest who are not professional media workers. Doliwa (2012) 
distinguishing many forms of citizen journalism depending on journalists’ motives 
and media in which they are active.
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take actions in the field of supporting democracy in countries in transition 
(Higgins, 2014; Howard, 2003; Rotham, 2015). To get better understand-
ing of such foreign assistance, the development cooperation between Po-
land and Ukraine aimed at fostering new media (journalists from online 
media, bloggers etc.) will be analysed in the next section of this paper.
Development cooperation between Poland and Ukraine
After the collapse of communism and following fruitful European 
integration, young democratic countries from the third wave of democ-
ratization (Huntington, 1991), which used to receive international aid in 
80s and 90s, have become to be active in the same field as donors assist-
ing democracy in less developed countries. Such involvement of Poland, 
which entered the difficult path of democracy in 1989, is a result of a will 
to build positive relations with neighbouring states and to share own tran-
sition experiences as well as to fulfil international commitments in terms 
of development cooperation. The choice of analysing Poland and Ukraine 
as countries cooperating within democracy assistance since early 90s us 
motivated by at least two reasons. Firstly, in terms of system transfor-
mation Poland and Ukraine as two post-communist countries started in 
similar positions. Although in recent years Poland played a role of young 
democracy, currently the country is experiencing the democratic backlash 
visible on the example of the Law and Justice government attempts to 
increase its influence over civil society, education system, judiciary and 
media. Despite those anti-democratic moves after 2015, in the perspec-
tive of last 10 years Poland seems to be consistent in providing support 
for democratisation in Ukraine as one of the most dynamically develop-
ing countries in the region of CEE.
All ‘new democracies’ in the CEE that joined EU and now are ac-
tive in the field of democracy assistance are ranked by Freedom House 
as ‘free’ with high level of freedom, political rights and civil liberties 
(FH, 2016). However, some of new EU members, such as Poland and 
Hungary, experienced recently anti-democratic backlashes. A manifes-
tation of authoritarian tendencies in the field of the media market in 
Poland is clearly visible on the example of increased state control over 
public media in Poland under the governance of Law and Justice (FH, 
2017a, 2017b) which resulted in the change of media freedom rate in 
Poland from ‘free’ to ‘partially free’ in 2017 for the first time after 
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1989.10 Media in Ukraine are rated as ‘partially free’ (FH, 2016, 2017a) 
with many areas of Ukrainian media system needed be improved and 
more democratic. Despite those unfavourable political conditions and 
attacks on media independence, Polish NGOs and journalists working 
in the field of media assistance might have a lot to offer in terms of 
sharing transition know-how in countries who still struggle with some 
limitations of freedom of expression. As Szent-Iványi points, new 
donors’ ‘vast body of transition experience most likely has the high-
est relevance for the eastern neighbours of the EU (Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan)’ due to partners’ common 
historical and social backgrounds (Szent-Iványi, 2014, p. 1103). Polish 
transition experiences include also opportunities and challenges related 
to the process of democratisation of media system in Poland which 
might be useful for Ukrainian media.
Polish democracy assistance efforts, including media assistance 
projects, are mainly funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
and coordinated by ‘Polish Aid’ as a leading program for developmental 
cooperation as well as by Solidarity Fund as State Treasury Foundation11. 
According to governmental documents, Polish democracy assistance is 
based on the idea of sharing Polish transition experience and treated as 
an important tool of foreign policy (MFA, 2013). Poland is engaged in 
supporting democracy as a member of Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) at Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) obligated to provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 
developing, partner countries.12 Polish democracy assistance, including 
10 The main imperfections of Polish media system are political dependence of 
public broadcast services and some of legal solutions such as defamation (FH, 2017a; 
Kobylińska, Makowski, Solon-Lipiński, 2012).
11 More on ‘Polish Aid’: https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/About,Polish,aid,202.
html, 20.05.2017 and Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/fundacja/o-fundacji/, 
20.05.2017.
12 During its transformation period, Poland received support provided by oth-
er countries, international organizations and institutions and organisations. Now as 
a member of the European Union as well as the OECD Development Assistance Com-
mittee, Poland is engaged in development aid as donor. OECD defines Official De-
velopment Assistance (ODA) as ‘those flows to countries and territories on the DAC 
List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: provided by official 
agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and 
each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is con-
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media assistance, is realised mainly by NGOs (Chimiak, 2016; Petrova, 
2014a; Pospieszna, 2014) on the basis of governmental and non-gov-
ernmental financial support coming from domestic and foreign actors.13 
ODA provided by Poland in Ukraine has both bilateral and multilateral 
character. Taking under consideration the big number and diversity of 
actors involved in development cooperation provided by Poland and its 
sources of funding, this paper focuses only on bilateral, Polish-Ukrainian, 
efforts to support media. In practice, only governmental call for papers 
for NGOs, public administration etc. in the area of democracy assistance 
will be analysed to see whether a) third sector in Poland acknowledged 
the need to support media development in Ukraine and if yes, ten what 
types of projects were implemented, and b) if the strategy of Polish MFA 
was modified after the change of ruling party in 2015.
Polish ODA for media in Ukraine
The Development Cooperation Acts (2013) set the basic guidelines 
for Polish ODA. Since 2000 in governmental reports on Polish develop-
ment cooperation Ukraine was listed as one of main partner countries 
receiving democratic support. In annual plans of development assistance, 
published since 2007, Ukraine has been mentioned as priority aid recipi-
ent as well as in Multiannual Development Cooperation Programmes for 
years 2012–2015 and 2016–2020.14 Polish MFA highlighted in both of 
multiannual programmes (MFA, 2012, 2016) the need of promoting ‘ob-
jective information and independent media’ within actions aimed at sup-
cessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated 
at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)’. Read more: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/of-
ficialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm, 20.05.2017.
13 Polish NGOs involved in democracy assistance are often the beneficiaries of 
financial grants coming from European Union, Visegrad Fund, US-based National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED), Polish-American Freedom Foundation and other 
governments, international organisations, foundations and private donors.
14 The complete list of governmental documents on Poland’s development co-
operation is available at Polish Aid’s website: https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/m/
Documents,and,Publications,208.html, 20.05.2017. It includes Annual Reports (2000–
2015), Multiannual Programme 2012–2015, Multiannual Programme 2016–2020, 
Polish aid programmes (2007–2011), Development Cooperation Plans (2012–2017), 
Strategy for Poland’s Development Co-operation (2003), Development Co-operation 
Act (2011) and several additional brochures.
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porting good governance. NGOs, who applied for governmental funds 
within Polish Aid, proposed many projects in the field of media assistance 
to implement the ideas expressed in the official strategies of development 
cooperation.15
Moreover, in 2014 ‘Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program’ was 
established to promote media development and self-governance. The ini-
tiative was dedicated to democracy assistance just in Ukraine and realised 
in order to finance two types of projects: a) supporting independent media, 
and b) supporting local governance.16 ‘Poland-Canada Democracy Sup-
port Program’ became one of the flagships of Polish democracy assistance 
initiatives based on the idea of sharing Polish transition experiences with 
Ukraine. None of the other aid programs so explicitly stressed the need 
to promote media as an important element of Ukrainian transition to de-
mocracy. ‘Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program’ budget reached 
approximately 16 million PLN and allowed to finance eleven projects 
aimed at media development. Support for new media was essential in six 
of mentioned media assistance projects.
However, the exact data on the amount of Poland’s support for tradi-
tional and new media are not available. Polish MFA has published only 
statistics showing bilateral and multilateral aid for recipient countries di-
vided into grant competitions (e.g. Polish Development Assistance 2015, 
Polish Aid Volunteering Programme 2015, Global Education 2015, Hu-
manitarian aid for Ukraine 2015 etc.), not into particular types of support 
(e.g. for media, local government, civil society etc.).17 However, such dis-
tinction was made by OECD while measuring DAC countries’ efforts in 
providing ODA. OECD distinguished aid dedicated to a) media and free 
15 The results of call for proposals (2004–2017): https://www.polskapomoc.gov.
pl/Konkursy,dotacyjne,14.html, 20.05.2017.
16 The program budget was approximately PLN 16 million (5.5 mln CAD). With-
in media assistance and local democracy assistance 40 Polish-Ukrainian annual and 
biannual projects were financed. Precise information on particular projects’ funding is 
unavailable. More: http://solidarityfund.pl/en/programs/poland-canada-democracy-
support-program/, 20.05.2017.
17 Statistics on Polish development cooperation in 2015: https://www.polskapo-
moc.gov.pl/Pomoc,w,liczbach,-,Rok,2015,2448.html, 20.05.2017. Only Zagranica 
Group as a platform of Polish NGOs working in the field of international develop-
ment cooperation provides a database of projects, including support dedicated to me-
dia development (without the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ media). However, 
this database lacks many implemented NGOs’ initiatives and projects. More: http://
zagranica.org.pl/baza/, 20.05.2017.
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flow of information, b) radio/television/print media, and c) information 
and communication technology.18 Data on Polish engagement in ODA 
goes back to 2013 when Poland joined the group of donors affiliated with 
DAC OECD.
Still, it is impossible to precisely distinguish the assistance given to 
traditional and digital media. The support for media and free flow of in-
formation might include trainings both for journalists working for ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ media outlets. Technical assistance for radio, TV and print me-
dia is dedicated traditional media but can be indirectly targeted at the 
development of their digital versions. Finally, the ODA for ICT might 
include the support given for new media – among other recipients. On the 
basis of OECD data, however incomplete, it can be concluded that Poland 
did invest in supporting media development in Ukraine, but regarding 
Polish ODA in total in Ukraine, these expenditures were not large.
Table 1
Media Assistance: Disaggregated Polish ODA in Ukraine 
(millions of US dollars)
2013 2014 2015 2016
Media and free flow of information n/a 0,73 0,24 n/a
Radio/television/print media n/a 0,063 n/a n/a
Information and communication technology (ICT) n/a n/a n/a n/a
Total amount of ODA 12,873 18,705 28,970 n/a
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data.
The governmental assistance for new media was provided not only 
within ‘Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program’ (2014–2016), but 
also to some extent in annual development cooperation grants within 
‘Polish Aid’. However, Polish media assistance in Ukraine was rather 
modest in comparison to support given to other sectors such as civil so-
18 ‘Media and free flow of information’ (15153) includes all ‘activities that sup-
port free and uncensored flow of information on public issues; activities that increase 
the editorial and technical skills and the integrity of the print and broadcast media, 
e.g. training of journalists’. ‘Radio/television/print media’ (22030) is understood 
as technical support given to ‘radio and TV links, equipment; newspapers; printing 
and publishing’. Finally, ‘information and communication technology (ICT)’ covers 
‘computer hardware and software; internet access; IT training’. More on OECD clas-
sification of ODA: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/purposecodessectorclassification.
htm, 20.05.2017.
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ciety, decentralisation reform, good governance. In years 2007–201719 
only several projects were proposed and financed by ‘Polish Aid’ except 
the support coming from Polish-Canadian initiative. Journalists working 
online started to receive attention only in 2012. The vast majority of the 
projects were realised as a result of cross-border cooperation between 
Polish and Ukrainian NGOs and media. One initiative in the field of me-
dia assistance was carried by the Embassy of Poland in Kiev. The table 
presented below shows the number of projects aimed at supporting media 
development (both traditional and new media) in Ukraine financed within 
Polish ODA.
Table 2
The number of media assistance projects implemented within 
‘Polish Aid’
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
0 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 0 0
Source: Own calculations. Excluding ‘Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program’.
Despite the fact that in Multiannual Development Cooperation Pro-
gramme 2016–2020 Polish MFA highlighted the need of promoting 
‘access to reliable and objective information’ and ‘independent media’ 
(MFA, 2015b, p. 13) and Ukraine remained one of priority countries, in 
2016–2017 there was no media assistance projects funded within Polish 
Aid as a result of announced call for proposals outside ending Poland-
Canada Democracy Support Program. The Polish-Canadian initiative was 
not continued by the Law and Justice government after 2016. Media as-
sistance, including support for new media, supposed to be maintained 
also on the basis of annual Development Cooperation Plan for 2016. This 
document stated that through Solidarity Fund financed will be projects of 
Polish NGOs aimed at ‘expending citizens’ access to reliable and objec-
tive information by developing independent media, in particular electron-
ic’ (MFA, 2015c) – including Ukraine. However, there was no adequate 
notation in Development Cooperation Plan for 2017 (MFA, 2016b).20
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland has not published full 
reports for years 2016–2017 yet. However, the results of call for paper are available: 
https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Konkursy,2017,2583.html, 20.05.2017.
20 According to official documents of MFA (MFA 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015, 2016), the number of financed projects within Polish Aid was low but 
stable.
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Given the fact that there have been no projects in the field of media 
assistance accepted to be implemented within ‘Polish Aid’ since the new 
Law and Justice government is in power, we are not able to support our 
assumption that Polish support for new media remains the same regard-
less the changes in the ruling government. Polish MFA did not publish the 
list of unsuccessful applications for projects, so is impossible to conclude 
whether there was no interest from NGOs in submitting media assistance 
proposals or the governmental funding priorities has changed as the result 
of new government ruled by Law and Justice. Considering the fact that 
since 2008 media assistance was continued by several Polish NGOs and 
that the new ruling party undertook many anti-democratic steps, includ-
ing limitation of freedom of the press, the second explanation sound more 
likely. However, conducting further research concerning also multilateral 
aid and support coming from private donors would be necessary to draw 
more precise conclusions.
Polish media assistance in Ukraine – NGOs projects
In order to verify the second hypothesis, assuming that Polish NGOs 
tailor media assistance projects respectively to the needs of aid recipients 
and current socio-political situation in Ukraine, we embark on examining 
the examples of aid projects implemented by NGOs in years 2007–2017. 
Following media assistance projects which were aimed at empowering 
journalists and developing new media will allow to reveal some mecha-
nism behind wider democracy assistance provided by Poland as new do-
nor. In addition to ODA data, the only possible source of data regarding 
media assistance comes from Polish NGOs that implement project in this 
field. Some of the Polish NGOs’ projects aimed at fostering Ukrainian 
new media development are financed within Polish governmental sourc-
es, but NGOs actively look also for other financial possibilities to finance 
their projects. Despite the difficulties in calculating the exact amount of 
funding for concrete projects accepted by Polish MFA as a result of an-
nounced call for proposals in years 2007–2017, in most cases revealing 
involved NGOs as projects’ initiators as well as getting detailed informa-
tion on their aims was possible. Information on specific projects – their 
goals, timeframe, names of NGOs responsible for the implementation, in 
some cases the amount of funding – were available in annual MFA reports 
and on the website.
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It is worth mentioning that none of the projects qualified for receiving 
Polish media support in years 2007–2011 explicitly addressed the matter 
of empowering new media journalists or developing online media outlets. 
All of the media projects proposed at this time by Polish third sector were 
aimed at assisting traditional journalists, especially from local media, and 
strengthening media independence. Polish NGOs started to introduce ini-
tiatives to promote digital media in 2012 within ‘Polish Aid’. Later, thanks 
to the existence of ‘Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program’ six im-
plemented projects included the support also for online media outlets and 
trainings in new technologies. The results of call for papers announced in 
2014 and 2015, proved that both grantees and Polish MFA21 were aware of 
the growing role of new media. Due to security reasons, the descriptions 
of three projects implemented in Ukraine in order to support media devel-
opment were not revealed at the requests of NGOs. Table below presents 
selected projects implemented after 2012 in Ukraine within Polish ODA 
which concentrated to some extend on fostering new media development.
Table 3
Assistance for online media in Ukraine funded through Polish development 
cooperation program (examples of projects)
Year Title of the project/Cooperating partners/Brief description
1 2
2014 The development of analytical and informational journalism in the regional 
media in Donetsk (2014)
Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor)
Association of Ukrainians in Poland (NGOs in Poland)
Internews Ukraine (News agency in Ukraine)
The scope of the training included issues related to the use of modern informa-
tion technologies, optimization of content and pictures on the internet, practical 
work with audio-visual materials. Journalists learned how to create infographics, 
quizzes, and various types of video for social media, including Facebook and 
Snapchat. Much of the training was devoted to practical tasks.a)
2015 Protection and Support for Journalists of Donbass
Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor)
Democratic Society East Foundation (TDW) (Polish NGO)
Research Center of Donbass Social Perspectives OstroV (Ukrainian NGO)
The project assumed to support journalists of ostro.org through providing knowl-
edge on safe functioning, including cyberspace safety techniques, ability to anal-
yse and present information for journalist covering conflict areas. The project 
included creation of a mobile version of ostro.org, 220 articles and 13,300 pieces 
of news.b)
21 Civic Platform governance.




Investigative journalism in Ukrainian regional and local media on guard 
of reforms
Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor)
Democratic Society East Foundation (TDW) (Polish NGO)
Regional Press Development Institute (RPDI) from Kiev (Ukrainian NGO)
The aim was to enhance the level of investigative journalism, increase secu-
rity of regional journalists (50) and to integrate them. It assumed financial help, 
broader access to legal advice, trainings in data visualization instruments and 
data journalism. The project included the usage of new media.c)
2015 Media Production Centre
Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor)
Polish Journalists Association (SDP) (Polish trade union)
Telekritika (Ukrainian medium)
The project assumed establishment of a Media Production Centre managed by 
independent NGO Telekritika, who deals with production and financing of ma-
terials concerning the situation in Donbass. A monthly talk-show focusing on 
social, economic and cultural problems was created and broadcast live by 24 lo-
cal channels of the state television with its online version.d)
2016 The civic wave in the region of Kiev and Donbas
Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor)
Education for Democracy Foundation (Polish NGO)
Hromadske Radio (Ukrainian medium)
The aim of the project is to support Hromadske Radio in broadcasting on ultra-
sonic waves in the Kyiv region and in the parts of Lugansk and Donetsk (includ-
ing territories affected by war activities). The ‘civic wave’ will be heard live 
on-line, through traditional radio, and through multimedia podcasts. Over 200 
programmes will be produced.e)
2016 Support for Crimean Tatar media
Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor)
The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Poland (Polish NGO)
Ukrainian journalists
The aim of the project is to support Crimean Tatar newspapers and journalists in 
2016. Support will be used both for the continuation of printed editions as well 
as the development of web portals.f)
a) Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/trening-narzedzia-multimedialne-dla-dzien ni-
karzy/, 20.05.2017.
b) Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/ochrona-i-wsparcie-dziennikarzy-donbasu/, 
20.05.2017.
c) Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/dziennikarstwo-sledcze-w-ukrainskich-mediach- 
regionalnych-i-lokalnych-na-strazy-reform/, 20.05.2017.
d) Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/centrum-produkcji-medialnej/, 20.05.2017.
e) Education for Democracy Foundation, https://fed.org.pl/obywatelska-fala-na-kijowsz-
czyznie-i-donbasie/, 20.05.2017.
f) Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/en/programs/poland-canada-democracy-support-
program/, 20.05.2017.
Source: Own compilation.
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Most of the projects that started in 2012 stressed the role of new media 
in raising the quality of journalism. Along with the growth of internet us-
ers in Ukraine and spread of popularity of online media outlets and social 
media, projects’ organisers naturally started to offer project including ele-
ments of digital media literacy, trainings for journalists in new tools avail-
able online, and the production of news dedicated to online media out-
lets. In 2014 Polish media assistance, which previously was focused on 
traditional press, TV and radio, evolved to more complex support which 
included also digital media.
The example of pioneer assistance for internet medium was ‘Support 
for Ukrainian youth media’ – a project run in 2012 by New Media Foun-
dation from Poland and aimed at supporting independent youth media. As 
a result, young journalists created 54 online press outlets on media free-
dom available at the platform Qmam.22 Other projects combined the ele-
ments of supporting ‘old’ and ‘new’ as in ‘Regional media in Ukraine for 
fair and free elections’ implemented by East European Democratic Centre 
(Poland) in cooperation with Municipal Center for Humanistic Technolo-
gies AHALAR (Ukraine) in 2014.23 The aim of the Polish-Ukrainian ini-
tiative was to support the development of regional media in Ukraine in 
favour to increase the transparency of elections foster their civic functions 
in society. What is important, selected journalists received from Polish 
and Ukrainian experts technological and know how support, including 
trainings of online media usage.
Those two examples of projects may serve as role models of a) a project 
aimed directly at developing online medium and b) as an example of ho-
listic media assistance involving both support for traditional and new me-
dia. The majority of aid initiatives, dedicated to Ukrainian media, treated 
assistance for digital outlets and professionals working online as a part of 
wider support for journalists and media. Surprisingly, none of the funded 
projects within bilateral cooperation in 2007–2015 provided direct sup-
port for bloggers or citizens journalists who also cover news from Ukraine 
or serve as watch-dogs controlling authorities just as traditional media 
workers. Such projects as the effort of Common Europe Foundation to es-
tablish and develop online portal Eastbook.eu which was financed jointly 
by Visegrad Fund and Polish Aid were rare and implemented only within 
multilateral aid. The projects concerned the support for online journalism 
22 New Media Foundation, http://www.fundacjanowemedia.org/, 20.05.2017.
23 Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/media-regionalne-na-ukrainie-dla-
wolnych-i-sprawiedliwych-wyborow/, 20.05.2017.
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and effective use of new media regarding emerging trends and challenges 
posed by digital media.24
In 2014 and 2015 Poland focused on media assistance in Eastern 
Ukraine, mostly on the aid dedicated to the journalist covering the areas of 
military conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The information cut off of 
the region of Donbas and the lack of security for journalists working in dan-
gerous circumstances were probably the main reasons why NGOs targeted 
its projects to support media in Eastern part of Ukraine. Polish projects in-
cluded technical support (new equipment) as well as conceptual assistance 
for e.g. journalists covering the armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia 
and for media belonging to the Tatar minority who was harassed as a result 
of the Annexation of Crimea by Russian Federation in 2014. Therefore, 
Poland by providing external funding for Ukrainian independent media got 
involved in information war between Ukraine and Russia.
Polish media assistance was also dedicated to journalists working 
for both traditional and online media in Ukraine in order to improve the 
transparency of public life and spread democratic values. Polish MFA as 
a grant-giver of NGOs’ media assistance projects aimed at strengthen-
ing and building social trust in Ukraine and control mechanisms. The 
belief in media fulfilling the function of watch-dog and the importance of 
strengthening the control mechanisms underpinned such media assistance 
projects which was formulated in the description on project.25 As a good 
example of such initiative was a project entitled ‘Investigative journalism 
in Ukrainian regional and local media on guard of reforms’ organised by 
Democratic Society East Foundation in years 2013–2016. Polish journal-
ist who participated in this project as an expert explained that during the 
trainings the emphasis was put on using online tools for journalism and 
the matter of digital security.26
The analysis of the NGOs’ projects allows us to make a conclusion 
that while assisting media development in Ukraine, Polish NGOs fol-
24 Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/eastbook-eu-usamodzielnienie-wersji-
ukrainskojezycznej/, 20.05.2017.
25 Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/dziennikarstwo-sledcze-w-ukrains-
kich-mediach-regionalnych-i-lokalnych-na-strazy-reform/, 20.05.2017. Democratic 
Society East Foundation, http://www.tdw.org.pl/material,dziennikarstwo-sledcze-
w-ukrainskich-mediach-regionalnych-i-lokalnych-na-strazy-reform-2015-2016,253.
html, 20.05.2017.
26 Interview with Beata Biel, specialist working for Google and Democratic Soci-
ety East Foundation, 11.04.2017, Warsaw.
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low the social and political developments in Ukraine and try to tailor 
their projects respectively to recipients’ needs and current situation in the 
country. After 2013 Polish media projects started to focus on supporting 
media from Eastern Europe which was motivated by severe difficulties 
that journalists from this regional faced in their work. NGOs acknowl-
edged also the necessity to promote investigative journalism which sup-
posed to help Ukrainians deals with the problem of corruption. And last 
but not least, Polish support since 2012 started to involve more and more 
investments in new media development. Therefore, the second hypothe-
sis, expecting flexibility from media assistance provided by Polish NGOs, 
has been supported.
Summary
As a result of relatively successful system transformation, Poland as 
donor country started to support freedom of expression and media within 
development cooperation with Ukraine in early 90s driven by the idea 
of sharing own transition experiences and building good relations with 
its neighbour. After joining the European Union in 2004 and becoming 
a member of DAC OECD, Poland confirmed its position as young, demo-
cratic country and emerging donor in the field of democracy assistance. 
Nonetheless, according to the recent reports on the freedom in the world, 
like many other countries, after 2015 also Poland suffered declines in 
the quality of democracy, including the governmental attacks on media 
independence. Such political shifts gave impetus to ask important ques-
tion about development cooperation as part of Polish foreign policy and 
international obligation.
This paper focuses on developmental assistance for new media in 
years 2007–2017 provided by Poland as donor in its priority partner 
country – Ukraine. The support given to Ukrainian journalists and media 
outlets fits Polish democracy assistance strategy within Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA). In principle, media assistance aims to improve 
freedom of speech and freedom of press, and in longer perspective to 
contribute to the consolidation of democracy. Poland is involved in sup-
porting pro-democratic changes in Ukraine, including media assistance, 
on the basis of development cooperation act (2013), multiannual devel-
opment cooperation programmes (2012–2015, 2016–2020) and annual 
plans (2007–2017). In years 2008–2013 the support for Ukrainian media 
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was maintained and intensified in 2014–2016 in connection with the im-
plementation of ‘Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program’ dedicated 
to media assistance and local governance assistance. After the expiration 
of this program, no more funds were allocated by MFA in 2016–2017 
to NGOs activities aimed at promoting the development of independent 
media.
A first bilateral Polish-Ukrainian project concerning new media as-
sistance and financed by Polish Aid was financed in 2012. Since then, 
NGOs started to include digital literacy and new technologies in projects’ 
proposals. The trainings of journalists in e.g. new online tools or direct 
support for establishing digital media outlets were continued until 2016. 
Six out of eleven media assistance projects implemented within ‘Poland-
Canada Democracy Support Program’ responded to the need of strength-
ening online media and improving journalists’ skills. Poland seemed also 
to target its media assistance regarding the needs of Ukraine as recipient 
of aid. Such tendency was visible on the example of shifts of beneficiar-
ies in 2014–2015. While before the outbreak of armed conflict between 
Ukraine and Russia Polish support had rather nationwide character, in 
2014–2015 many projects concentrated on delivering aid to journalists 
and media from Eastern Ukraine. The vast majority of project was ad-
dressed to professional journalists gaining experiences in working online, 
while there was no significant interest in empowering Ukrainian bloggers 
or citizen journalists.
Therefore, with confidence we can conclude, based on the analysis con-
ducted, that the second hypothesis assuming that Poland actively takes at-
tempt to support media respectively to socio-political situation in recipient 
country has been supported. Not only Polish projects focus on new media 
development regarding their growing popularity, but NGOs also acknowl-
edge emerging journalists’ problems, needs, and the obstacles to counting 
professional development due to ongoing armed conflict. However, we 
were not able to support our first hypothesis in which we expected that 
Polish governmental support for new media has been maintained regard-
less the changes in the ruling government. While Polish Aid financed media 
assistance projects in Ukraine in years 2008–2015 (Civic Platform govern-
ance), as the result of call for papers for open competition for develop-
ment cooperation in 2016 and 2017, no projects in the field of media were 
funded. Assessing the reasons of state of art requires further research.
Last but not least, it should be emphasised that this paper examined 
only bilateral development cooperation between Poland and Ukraine 
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funded by Polish MFA and realised mainly by Polish NGOs together with 
their Ukrainian partners. To receive a bigger picture of media assistance 
efforts undertaken by diverse entities, it would be necessary to include also 
multilateral aid within e.g. European Union, and foreign donors providing 
funds for Polish initiatives such as National Endowment for Democracy 
(US). By examining Polish bilateral ODA aimed at supporting media, this 
work drew attention to the role of NGOs in shaping the practice of Polish 
development cooperation, being an instrument of foreign policy.
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W efekcie stosunkowo udanej transformacji systemowej niektóre młode, demo-
kratyczne kraje, które jeszcze w latach 80-tych i 90-tych otrzymywały pomoc de-
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mokratyzacyjną, zaangażowały się w charakterze nowych donatorów we wspieranie 
pro-demokratycznych przemian w mniej rozwiniętych państwach. Relacje pomię-
dzy post-komunistycznymi donatorami a odbiorcami pomocy można obserwować 
na przykładzie współpracy rozwojowej Polski i Ukrainy. Artykuł koncentruje się na 
kwestii polskiego wsparcia rozwojowego, udzielanego Ukrainie w latach 2007–2017 
w ramach Polskiej Pomocy. Niniejsza praca ma za zadanie udzielić odpowiedzi na 
pytania o to czy polskie, rządowe wsparcie dla ukraińskich mediów jest kontynuowa-
ne pomimo zmiany partii rządzącej oraz czy polskie organizacje pozarządowe, które 
realizują pomoc rozwojową w oparciu o finansowanie Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicz-
nych RP, dopasowują swoje projekty do aktualnych potrzeb beneficjentów wsparcia 
i aktualnej sytuacji na Ukrainie. Autorki stawiają sobie jako cel zwrócenie uwagi na 
związki pomiędzy zaangażowaniem państw zewnętrznych i istnieniem niezależnych 
mediów a procesami demokratyzacji i wysiłkami, jakie podejmowane są przez tzw. 
nowych donatorów w państwach partnerskich.
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